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ABSTRACT 
 
Volatile oil prices and political uncertainty surrounding uninterrupted oil supplies 
has pressured the U.S. Congress and economists to search for substitutes.  In response, 
the U.S. has enacted policies to directly support the production and use of biofuel.  The 
current Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) requires 36 billion gallons of renewable fuel use 
by 2022.  A large proportion of the mandate is to consist of corn-based ethanol.  Most 
ethanol is consumed in the U.S. as a 10 percent blend of ethanol and gasoline.  In 2014, 
it is projected oil refineries will hit the blend wall (BW).  In short, oil refineries are 
required to blend more ethanol into gasoline than is allowed by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA).  As a consequence, the EPA will need to either reduce the 
Renewable Fuel Standard for 2014, or permit additional ethanol blends to be sold.     
Overall, the purpose of the study was to analyze the economic impact of 
changing energy policy on ethanol markets.  A structural, supply and demand model was 
developed.  Four equations were estimated, and residuals were simulated to estimate 
probability distributions for monthly ethanol prices and total demand.  Alternative 
scenarios were developed to estimate how the RFS, the BW, and corn prices affect 
ethanol markets. 
The parameter estimates indicated the major determinants of ethanol demand 
were the RFS and the BW.  The results showed the RFS and the BW positively affected 
the price of ethanol and demand.  The base scenario estimated average ethanol price to 
be $1.89/gal.  When the RFS was reduced by 10.59 percent, ethanol prices were 
 iii 
 
estimated to decline $0.29/gal, compared to the base scenario.  Total demand declined 
600 million gallons.  If the BW was increased to 15 percent, the price of ethanol 
increased approximately $1.10/gal from the base scenario.  Total demand increased 1.4 
billion gallons in response.  Ethanol prices were found to be insensitive to corn prices.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 General Overview 
The rise in world oil prices and political uncertainty regarding uninterrupted oil 
supplies has compelled political figures and economists to search for substitutes.  In the 
United States, suggestions have been made for alternative fuel sources, such as solar and 
hydrogen power, yet these have only been implemented on a small scale and have 
largely failed to gain widespread acceptance.  In response, the U.S. Congress enacted 
both state and federal policies which aim to directly support and promote the production 
and use of biofuels for transportation, in particular, corn-based ethanol.  Policy measures 
include tax credits given to blenders who mix ethanol with gasoline, an import tariff to 
protect domestic producers, research grants to promote the development of new biofuel 
technology, and perhaps the most prominent, minimum usage requirements to guarantee 
a market for biofuel which is completely unrelated to its costs.  This minimum usage 
requirement is known as the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS).  As a result, ethanol 
production and use has grown more than 150 percent since 2006 (EIA 2013a). 
Originally, the tax credit and import tariff were the most noteworthy of federal 
support programs.  Since the establishment of the RFS in 2005 and its expansion in 
2007, Congress has required biofuel use.  It is possible the RFS will play a dominant role 
in the development and promotion of biofuel use in the future.   
The RFS program has had its share of controversy.  Supporters of the RFS claim 
it improves U.S. energy security by reducing reliance on imported oil, and reduces 
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gasoline prices at the pump (EIA 2013a; Pouliot and Babcock 2014).  Critics of RFS 
argue the expanded mandate has driven up livestock feed prices by allocating corn for 
ethanol production (Elobeid et al. 2007). 
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
The rapid expansion of U.S. corn ethanol production has motivated questions 
regarding its long-term sustainability and unintended consequences in other markets.  
Energy policy in the U.S. can affect corn and ethanol markets in several ways.  Because 
of this, there has been considerable political pressure to negotiate an overhaul of the RFS 
program from livestock producers and petroleum manufacturers.  In 2012, the National 
Chicken Council petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to waive all or 
a substantial part of the corn-based ethanol mandate, citing the RFS has harmed major 
agricultural markets in this U.S. because the RFS has directly affected the supply and 
cost of feed (Formica 2012).   The American Petroleum Institute in August of 2013 also 
filed a petition to partially waive the 2014 RFS mandate, citing the economic 
implications of hitting the ethanol blend wall (BW) could significantly increase the cost 
of fuel and result in fuel supply shortages in the United States (Greco and Moskowitz 
2013).  In response, the EPA released it proposed standards and volumes for renewable 
fuels for 2014, which have been substantially reduced from their statutory standards.   
Overall, the EPA slashes the implied corn ethanol mandate by 10.59 percent to 11.73 
billion gallons (EPA 2013b).   
 3 
 
The issue with the RFS program is the required mandate for 2014 is likely to 
cause U.S. gasoline consumption to hit the ethanol BW.  Once the average ethanol blend 
in the U.S. approaches or exceeds 10 percent by volume, the EPA will need to either 
reduce the RFS for 2014 or permit additional ethanol blends, such as E15 or E20, to be 
sold.  This paper will address the economic impact of policy on ethanol markets by 
investigating how the RFS influences ethanol demand, as well as the implications of 
relaxing the BW to allow the sale of higher ethanol blends in gasoline. 
 
1.3 Objective 
The primary objective of this paper is to analyze the economic impacts of 
changes in energy policy on ethanol markets.  Monte Carlo simulation will be applied to 
calculate stochastic monthly ethanol prices and total demand.  The results should assist 
decision-makers in estimating how changes in energy policy affect ethanol markets.   
This paper begins with a background on energy policy in the United States, 
which examines the current state of energy policy, as well as the history of ethanol use in 
the United States.  The BW is discussed, in addition to the characteristics of the 
Renewable Identification Number system (RIN) that makes implementation of the RFS 
possible.  The literature review emphasizes already completed research related to ethanol 
pricing and policy analysis. Section 4 explains risk and simulation, presents the 
economic theory behind the RFS and the BW and will discuss the general framework of 
the model and explain how it works.  Chapter 5 analyzes the regression parameters and 
presents the results of the simulation.   
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2. BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 MTBE (Methyl tertiary butyl ether) 
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 require areas of the U.S. with poor air 
quality to blend chemical additives called “oxygenates” into gasoline to improve 
combustion and mitigate tailpipe emissions (EPA 2013a).  The amendments created two 
programs which required the use of oxygenates, but the reformulated gasoline (RFG) 
program was the more significant of the two.  The RFG program required areas with 
severe ozone pollution problems to use RFG. RFG was required to contain at least 2 
percent oxygen by weight and blenders were permitted to use a variety of additives 
which contained oxygen to meet this requirement (McCarthy and Tiemann 2006).   
Methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) was the most widely used oxygenate.  Its use 
grew rapidly in the 1980’s in response to a need for an octane enhancer due to the phase-
out of lead in gasoline.  Unfortunately, its use began to raise environmental concerns 
when it was detected in drinking water supplies and reservoirs across the country. A 
report issued in November 1998 by the University of California recommended a gradual 
phase-out of MTBE from gasoline in California.  MTBE was phased-out in favor of 
ethanol in 2003 (McCarthy and Tiemann 2006).  Liability concerns led to a nationwide 
ban.  When compared to other gasoline components, MTBE is more soluble in water, 
has a lower taste and odor threshold, and often requires more expensive and complicated 
techniques of environmental remediation (McCarthy and Tiemann 2006).  Typically, 
MTBE is released into ground water through leaky underground storage facilities.   
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In 2005, petroleum companies announced their intent to remove MTBE from 
gasoline.  The decision was fueled primarily by State bans due to water contamination 
issues and perceived liability exposure after the oxygenate requirement was eliminated 
from RFG by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Shore 2006).   
The elimination of MTBE from gasoline stimulated demand for other 
oxygenates. Oxygenates that could replace MTBE include other ethers, such as ethyl 
tertiary butyl ether (ETBE), and alcohols, such as ethanol (McCarthy and Tiemann, 
2006).  The RFS was instated at the same time the MTBE requirement was removed.  In 
response, blenders switched from MTBE to ethanol.  Ethanol is considered to pose less 
environmental threats compared to MTBE.  An article, based on the California ethanol 
review focused specifically on groundwater contamination risks by various formulations 
of gasoline (Powers et al. 2001).  The authors concluded that there is an increase in risk 
of groundwater contamination by RFG when using either MTBE or ethanol to oxygenate 
fuel, but that risk decreases for ethanol after five years.  Because ethanol will degrade in 
the ground over time, it is considered the practical option to meet the oxygenate 
requirement in gasoline.  
 
2.2 Ethanol 
 Alternative transportation fuels, particularly corn-based ethanol, is considered by 
policy-makers as a likely solution to issues surrounding excessive dependence of foreign 
oil and global warming.  Federal energy policy has played a significant part in the 
development of the U.S. biofuels industry.  Energy policies in the U.S. consist of several 
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policy measures for ethanol, (a) including minimum alternative fuel requirements, (b) 
blending tax credits, (c) an import tariff, (d) loans and (e) research grants.  Since the 
1980s, domestic ethanol producers have been protected by an import tariff, mainly 
intended to curb sugarcane imports from Brazil (UNICA 2011).  Blenders have also 
received a tax credit for each gallon of ethanol mixed into gasoline.  The import tariff 
and tax credit expired at the end of 2011. 
The RFS is one of the more prominent forms of federal policy support. The RFS 
mandates each year a minimum volume of biofuels that is to be blended in the national 
transportation fuel supply.  The RFS was first established in 2005 when Congress 
enacted the Energy Policy Act (GPO 2005).  This became known as RFS1.  RFS1 
required a minimum of 4 billion gallons of renewable fuel in 2006, and that minimum 
volume was set to rise to 7.5 billion gallons by 2012 (GPO 2005).   
The federal government greatly expanded its energy policy when Congress 
enacted the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (GPO 2007).  The primary 
goal of the Independence and Security Act (EISA) was to improve vehicle fuel economy 
and reduce U.S. dependency on imported oil.  EISA imposed new provisions to expand 
RFS1 to include diesel, in addition to gasoline.  The expanded RFS1 (known as RFS2) 
applies to most transportation fuels intended for highway vehicles, non-road, 
locomotive, and marine diesel in the U.S.  The expanded RFS increased the volume of 
renewable fuel required for blending from 9 billion gallons in 2008 to 36 billion gallons 
by 2022 (GPO 2007).   
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Table 2.1. EISA 2007 Expansion of the Renewable Fuel Standard 
 
 
 
 
The table presents the expanded RFS mandate enacted by EISA.   RFS2 
established four distinct categories of renewable fuel; total renewable fuels, advanced 
biofuels from non-corn feedstock, cellulosic biofuel, and biomass-based diesel.  The 
applicable volumes for biomass-based diesel for calendar years beyond 2012 will be 
determined by the EPA based on review and analysis of the RFS program during the 
specified years (GPO 2007).  There is no specific category for corn-based ethanol, but it 
can be implied by subtracting out the advanced biofuel and biomass-based diesel 
categories.  The mandate for cellulosic biofuel is assumed to be zero.  
Under RFS2, the U.S. government is directly supporting biofuel production by 
requiring fuel blenders to incorporate minimum volumes of biofuels into their annual 
fuel sales, regardless of market prices (Schnepf and Yacobucci 2013).  In essence, by 
mandating renewable fuel use through RFS, the U.S. is creating a mandatory market for 
biofuels by providing an indirect subsidy to reduce risk and encourage the development 
of biofuel plants.   
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2.3 Blend Wall 
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 made alterations to the requirements of RFG that 
triggered a nationwide phase-out of MTBE starting in 2006.  Since that time, the demand 
for ethanol as a fuel additive has risen sharply.  Under current regulations, gasoline 
blends containing up to 10 percent ethanol by volume (E10) can be sold for use in all 
gasoline-powered vehicles.  E85, which is a blend containing up to 85 percent ethanol by 
volume, may also be sold, but is sold in limited quantities and can only be used by 
specifically designed vehicles. 
The total volume of ethanol which can be blended into gasoline is capped at 10 
percent.  This upper limit is called the BW.  Yacobucci (2010) identifies three factors 
which influence the BW constraint: 
 First, the Clean Air Act prohibits the sale of gasoline which contains 
additives at levels which exceed those approved by the EPA.  For ethanol, 
the limit is 10 percent.   
 Second, automakers have not warrantied their vehicles to operate reliably 
with higher blends and it is unclear whether vehicle owners would be 
willing to purchase the new blends without explicit approval from the 
manufacturer.   
 Third, existing infrastructure and transportation is designed to deliver E10 
blends, and it has not been determined if the existing supply chain can 
tolerate higher ethanol concentrations. 
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To address the BW issue, ethanol will either have to be blended in higher concentrations 
or sold as an alternative fuel for flexible fuel vehicles.  
The RFS has ultimately created an untenable situation.  If approval is not given 
to allow the sale of higher ethanol blends in gasoline, the market for E10 will become 
completely saturated, and ethanol producers will have few avenues for increasing sales.  
Their first option would be to export the excess ethanol once the BW is reached.  The 
other option is to petition the EPA to raise the allowable limit on ethanol content in 
gasoline to 15 percent.  Increasing the maximum allowable volume of ethanol in 
gasoline would increase ethanol’s market potential by 50 percent.   
 
2.4 Introduction of E15 
 The EPA has the authority to waive fuel requirements under certain 
circumstances.  Waivers are the first step in making E15 readily available to consumers.   
Approving the sale of E15 would help boost a stagnating demand for ethanol caused by 
the current blend limit of 10 percent.  In 2009, Growth Energy petitioned the EPA to 
allow the introduction of E15, a blend of gasoline which contains up to 15 percent 
ethanol, into commerce (EPA 2011).   The following year, the EPA approved the use of 
E15 in vehicles specifically designed to operate on the higher blend.  A positive shift in 
the BW will likely increase the price of ethanol.  The price effect is caused by higher 
demand for ethanol.   
 An EPA approval is not the only obstacle in permitting the sale of higher ethanol 
blends.  There is debate whether or not the existing fuel supply infrastructure can 
 10 
 
actually support higher ethanol blends (Yacobucci 2010).  Most existing pipelines, tanks, 
and gas pumps are designed to handle E10.  It is questionable fuel suppliers would be 
willing to sell the higher ethanol blends if there is a possibility it could damage their 
existing transportation system.  In addition to fuel supply concerns, drivers of older 
vehicles will need to be convinced their vehicle will not be damaged by the higher blend.   
 
2.5 The RIN System 
The Renewable Identification Number (RIN) system was developed by the EPA 
to ensure compliance of the RFS mandates. A RIN is a 38-character numeric code that 
corresponds to a batch of ethanol fuel that is imported or produced in the U.S. RINs 
remain with the volume of renewable fuel throughout the entire distribution system until 
the ethanol is blended with gasoline.  Once the ethanol has been blended, RINs can be 
used for compliance, traded, or held for future compliance (McPhail et al. 2011).  
RINs form the basis of RFS2 compliance.  The EPA developed an electronic 
Moderated Transaction System (EMTS) to facilitate this process by monitoring and 
reporting RIN transactions compliance (McPhail et al. 2011).  To participate in RFS2, a 
person or corporation must first register with the EPA and create an account via the 
EPA’s Central Data Exchange.  After registration, an ethanol producer can electronically 
submit a new volume of renewable fuel produced or view the number of RINs generated 
or assigned.  This system also facilitates the buying and selling of RINs.  A seller can 
post the sale price of their RIN in the system, and upon acceptance by a buyer, the 
buyers account will automatically be increased by the number of RINs purchased.  
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The RIN system is instrumental to the successful implementation of RFS2.  Each 
year, the EPA calculates a percentage standard for renewable fuel to total gasoline 
consumption.  Obligated parties must meet their renewable volume obligation (RVO) by 
accumulating RINs that represent an amount of renewable fuel used as transportation 
fuel sold in the United States.   The RVO is equal to the RFS for the calendar year i (in 
percentage terms) multiplied by the annual nonrenewable gasoline volume produced or 
imported by the obligated party in calendar year i, plus any renewable fuel deficit from 
the previous year (McPhail et al. 2011).  An obligated party can carry over a deficit, 
under certain conditions, as long as the deficit is covered in full the following year.  
Obligated parties can retain RINs in excess of their RVO, which can be held to meet 
future compliance (subject to a 20 percent roll over gap), or they can be traded. 
RINs are sold on spot markets because RINs are bought and sold as 
commodities.   The actual RIN price includes the core value of the RIN, transaction 
costs, and/or a speculative component.  In figure 2.1, the core value of a RIN is the gap 
between the supply price (Ps) and the demand price (Pd) at any given mandated quantity 
(Thompson et al. 2009).   The supply curve represents the price that allows ethanol 
producers to cover their cost of production.  Similarly, the demand curve corresponds to 
the price blenders are willing to pay for that volume of ethanol, absent the mandate.  If 
market equilibrium exceeds the mandate, then the core RIN value is zero.  RIN prices 
will be positive if the mandate (represented by the vertical RFS2 line) exceeds market 
equilibrium.  Note that the supply price (the price producers receive) is equal to the 
demand price (the price blenders are willing to pay with no mandate) plus the core value 
 12 
 
of the RIN.  This calculation ensures all costs are covered, assuming the mandated levels 
are produced, by bridging the gap between the cost of production and the price blenders 
are willing to pay for that quantity.  In theory, the market for RINs ensures the mandated 
demand for ethanol will generate high enough ethanol price to allow ethanol producers 
to their cover cost of compliance.  Because RINs represent the per-unit cost of 
complying with the mandate, high prices suggest a high cost of compliance to meet the 
mandate. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. RIN Market with a Binding Mandate 
 
 
 
Prior to 2013, there has been an excess supply of ethanol RINs (beyond what is 
needed to meet the overall portion of the RFS) in the market, which has kept prices 
relatively low, between one and four cents per gallon (see figure 2.2).  Low RIN prices 
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signal mandates do not force more consumption than is desired by blenders, which 
implies a low cost of compliance.  During the second half of 2012, RIN prices increased 
slightly in response to a drought which affected U.S. corn and ethanol production.  RIN 
prices rose drastically beginning in 2013, to over one dollar per gallon.  The approaching 
ethanol BW and has been identified as a potential cause in the surge in RIN prices, 
primarily because of a limited supply of RINs, combined with surging demand from 
blenders to buy RINs to comply with the RFS mandate (Tracy 2013).  When volumetric 
blending levels for RFS were set in 2007, policy makers and industry representatives did 
not expect the level of ethanol demand would exceed the 10 percent limit until much 
later.  But, steadily declining gasoline demand coupled with increased fuel efficiency 
means the BW will be met much sooner than anticipated (EIA 2013a).  If RIN prices 
remain high, this is a sign ethanol demand has hit the BW and obligated parties are 
having difficulty meeting their RVOs, which should pressure the EPA to approve higher 
ethanol blends.  While the RIN market is cornerstone in the overall coordination of the 
biofuel market, it is beyond the scope of this study.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. RIN Prices 
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3. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Modeling the economic and environmental effects of biofuel policy has become 
increasingly complex because of the lack of market information regarding ethanol 
pricing (Kim et al. 2010).   High crude oil prices and dependency on foreign oil supplies 
have incentivized the need and the development of alternative fuel sources such as 
ethanol and biodiesel.   The incentives to provide a market for biofuels is policy driven, 
primarily through EISA and the Renewable Fuel Standard.  Because policy interacts 
with the market for biofuels, particularly ethanol, it’s important to have a clear 
understanding of the underlying market for biofuel, as well its policy implications in 
other markets. 
Elobeid and Tokgoz (2008) evaluated the impact of removing the federal tax 
credit in the United States on price volatility in the U.S. and Brazil using a multi-market 
international ethanol model. The general structure of their model consists of production, 
consumption, ending stocks, and net trade equations for the United States, Brazil, and 
the EU.  Demand for ethanol was estimated using the $.51 tax rebate refiners receive 
when they blend ethanol with gasoline, the required ethanol blend in percentage terms, 
and RFS.   Supply for ethanol in the US is derived as a function of the US price for 
ethanol, the price of oil, policy variables, and the annual quantity of gasoline supplied. 
The study finds that the U.S. is effectively protecting their ethanol industry through the 
use of trade barriers.  When the tax credit is removed, the U.S. sees higher ethanol prices 
and increases in imports of ethanol.  With trade liberalization, they find the ethanol 
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market to be less vulnerable to price changes due to supply and demand shocks.  The 
model also estimated elasticities of supply and demand for ethanol.  They estimate the 
elasticity of supply and demand to be .65 and -.43, respectively.   
The BW is a major obstacle in the advancement of the ethanol industry.  The BW 
constraint on ethanol production is partially due to existing infrastructure limitations and 
the availability of flex-fuel vehicles (Wisner 2009).  The EPA must approve a waiver to 
increase the fuel-ethanol blend limit beyond 10 percent.  Growth Energy, a biofuel 
industry advocacy group, submitted a request to allow the ethanol blend limit to be 
increased to 15 percent, citing enhanced energy security through increased renewable 
fuel consumption and lower gasoline prices (Growth Energy 2009).  A partial waiver to 
allow fuel-ethanol blends between 10 and 15 percent ethanol by volume to be introduced 
into commerce was granted in November of 2010 (Jackson 2010).  Zhang et.al. (2010) 
proposed a profit maximization model for ethanol blenders to analyze the possibility of a 
positive shift in the BW from 10 to 15 percent ethanol. The study found a relaxation of 
the BW will lead to increased ethanol consumption and less oil consumption.  The 
demand response will likely increase the prices of ethanol and E85, while reducing the 
price of ethanol blended gasoline.  A related biofuel model built by Tyner, Taheripour, 
and Hurt (2012), addressed the impact of a drought on corn and ethanol markets, and 
how an EPA waiver to reduce RFS might affect those markets.  A drought would affect 
businesses and consumers who use food and fuel by increasing food prices and gasoline 
prices, due to higher ethanol prices caused by higher corn prices. But, the magnitude of 
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the change will depend on the decision by the EPA to reduce the RFS.  An estimation of 
the impact an RFS waiver will have on ethanol markets in not given.   
Other studies have questioned whether corn ethanol production is economically 
viable without mandates.  Babcock (2013) developed a simulation model for corn and 
ethanol markets which determined economic viability based on market supply and 
demand curves for corn-based ethanol.  The model estimates the feasibility of the 
ethanol industry by calculating breakeven ethanol price, corn price, and corn production 
under variations in harvested acreage, yield, and gasoline price.   The model was run 
under two different scenarios.  One scenario utilized a kinked demand curve which 
portrayed a high willingness to pay for ethanol at volumes below the 10 percent level, 
and a sharp decline for volumes in excess of 10 percent.  The alternative is a demand 
curve which is perfectly elastic at 70 percent of the energy value of gasoline.  The first 
scenario finds if the market values ethanol as a fuel additive, the average ethanol 
production level ranges from 12 to 14 billion gallons when gas prices are high.  The 
results imply the industry is viable, even if ethanol prices fall.  The second scenario 
determined viability to be much more sensitive to gasoline prices when the market only 
values the energy content of ethanol and gasoline prices are high.  
Thompson, Meyer, and Westhoff (2008) analyzed how RFS, crude oil prices and 
corn yield volatility influence the U.S. ethanol market.  They used a model developed 
and maintained by the Food and Policy Research Institute at the University of Missouri 
(FAPRI) and simulated a stochastic structural model that incorporated RFS to assess 
how shocks to corn and oil markets affect ethanol price and use.  Scenario analysis was 
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used to estimate ethanol prices and use with and without RFS. The authors concluded 
that RFS makes ethanol prices more sensitive to corn yields and less sensitive to oil 
prices overall.  They also note it is possible for ethanol use to exceed the mandate when 
oil prices and corn yields are high, while limiting downside adjustments when prices and 
yields are low.   
Other researchers have focused their efforts on the long-run impact of ethanol 
production growth and its impact on U.S. and world agriculture.  Elobeid et.al. (2007) 
developed an integrated multi-commodity, multi-country model which they used to 
estimate the long-run potential for ethanol production by calculating the corn price at 
which the incentive to expand ethanol production disappears.  This is basically the price 
at which corn ethanol plants breakeven.   Scenarios and sensitivity analysis was 
conducted to show the impact of changes in key assumptions.  The authors estimated at a 
breakeven price of $4.05, with corn-based ethanol production reaching 31.5 billion 
gallons per year.  To support this level of production, 95.6 million acres of corn will 
have to be planted.  Total corn production would be approximately 15.6 billion bushels.   
 One drawback to the studies is they ignore risk in their forecasts.  Some authors 
quantify market level impacts of policy variables and prices, but make no attempt to 
discuss the probability of those outcomes.  The approach taken here will develop a 
model of the U.S. ethanol industry which combines the framework developed by Elobeid 
and Tokgoz (2008), stochastic processes, variable RFS, and exogenous corn prices to 
simulate monthly ethanol prices in the U.S.  The model will also evaluate the economic 
impact of an EPA waiver to shift the BW outwards, to say E15 or E20. 
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4. METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Simulation 
In the literature review section, studies were reviewed that addressed the RFS 
and other policies that impact ethanol markets.  Thompson, Meyer, and Westhoff (2008) 
incorporated stochastic components into their research.  Because risk is inherent in 
econometric modeling, simulation is the best method for evaluating risk and the 
feasibility of a particular risky decision.  Any variable in an econometric model which 
the decision-maker (DM) cannot control is considered risky.  There are two types of 
models identified in the literature review that can be used to analyze agricultural 
markets.  In deterministic models, the assumption is all exogenous variables do not 
change, and the interrelationship between variables is constant.  Thus, these models 
provide point forecasts, and do not evaluate impacts of risk.  In stochastic models, the 
assumption is relaxed allowing one or more of the exogenous variables to be random.  
The randomness creates variability in terms of input values within the model, which is 
used to generate probability distributions for the evaluation of risk on the output 
variables.  We can then incorporate alternative scenarios into the analysis to measure 
their effects on the model probabilistically.  A decision-maker could then select the best 
scenario based on policy goals and the likelihood of occurrence. 
We use simulation as a tool to improve the decision-making process by 
estimating “the shapes of probability distributions for variables we cannot observe” 
(Richardson 2013).  The presence of unknown probability distributions implies risk 
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which complicates the decision-making process.  Simulation can quantify the risk 
associated with selected key output variables (KOVs) by producing hundreds of possible 
outcomes, instead of one finite value.  The results show not just what could happen, but 
also the likelihood of those outcomes. 
The process of simulation involves solving a set of mathematical equations, 
which represent an economic system, given a set of input data.  Typically, simulation 
models are used to answer “what-if” type questions.  The primary goal of simulation is 
to imitate how the actual system would respond to changes in input variables and policy 
decisions.  The model should cover enough detail of the real system to adequately 
answer the research question.  The model is then solved hundreds of times using 
stochastic shocks to the risky variables to statistically represent most all possibilities of 
random values as defined by their probability distributions.  The result is an empirical 
estimate of the risk and probability distributions for the KOVs. 
The preferred method of probability sampling is the Latin Hypercube procedure 
because it reduces the number of iterations that must be simulated (Richardson 2008). 
The procedure divides the probability distribution equally into N intervals, where N is 
the number of iterations, and one random value is drawn from each interval.  By dividing 
the probability distribution into N intervals, the Latin Hypercube method insures all 
possible random values are considered in the simulation. 
The residuals from the structural econometric equations will be simulated using a 
normal distribution, assuming a mean of zero and a standard deviation equal to the 
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standard deviation of the residuals.  Thus, risk associated with the equations in the model 
will be incorporated into the estimated KOVs. 
 
4.2 Theoretical Approach 
 Economic theory has the potential to investigate market consequences associated 
with ethanol regulation.  Figure 4.1 is used to provide a graphical representation that can 
be used to explain the demand curve for ethanol.  The so-called ethanol BW constrains 
growth in the ethanol industry by limiting the domestic demand for ethanol.  The BW 
requires no more than 10 percent ethanol, E10, will be blended in the U.S. transportation 
fuel supply each year, which essentially creates a perfectly inelastic kink in the demand 
curve for ethanol at 10 percent of annual gasoline consumption.  Any blends higher than 
E10, such as E15 or E20, will require a waiver by the EPA and a flex-fuel vehicle 
capable of using the higher blend.  In the figure, a waiver will shift the maximum 
volume of ethanol which can be blended into gasoline outward from E10 to say E20. 
The other policy which directly impacts the ethanol industry is RFS.  Ethanol 
mandates under RFS create a production floor for the ethanol industry, creating long-run 
industry security and a minimum demand for ethanol.  This creates another kink in the 
demand curve for ethanol (figure 4.1).  The kink forces the demand for ethanol to be 
perfectly inelastic at the RFS level for that year.  The RFS mandate level currently is less 
than the annual demand for ethanol as a fuel additive at Qe. 
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Figure 4.1. Kinked Domestic Demand Curve for Ethanol 
 
 
 
In figure 4.1, the domestic demand curve for ethanol is segmented into pieces.   
Price per gallon and quantity of ethanol are on the y and x-axis, respectively.  The RFS 
mandate is the minimum quantity demanded for ethanol, which causes the demand curve 
to become perfectly inelastic at that level.  Demand is negatively sloping until Qe 
exceeds the maximum volume of ethanol which can be blended into gasoline.  E10, E15, 
and E20 represent the maximum percentage of ethanol by volume which can be blended 
into gasoline each year. Domestic demand is perfectly inelastic at quantities of ethanol 
beyond the maximum level.  Pe and Qe are free-market equilibrium price and quantity 
demanded, as long as the quantity produced is between the RFS and the BW at E10.    
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4.3 Data  
 Data were obtained from various sources and ranges from year 2006 through 
October 2013.  Monthly corn and ethanol prices were obtained from the USDA’s 
Economic Research Service Feed Grains Database.  Ethanol prices are wholesale, rack 
prices in the city of Omaha, Nebraska.  Monthly ethanol production, consumption, trade, 
and oil price data were obtained from U.S. Energy Information Administration Monthly 
Energy Review.  All prices have been deflated using the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
segmented producer price index (PPI); ethanol prices were deflated using the energy 
related finished goods category, while oil prices were deflated using the crude materials  
for further processing category.   
 
4.4 Model Development 
The purpose of the model is to estimate equilibrium ethanol prices subject to 
changes in exogenous corn prices, the BW, and the RFS.  A recursive, structural partial 
equilibrium framework was developed to solve for equilibrium monthly ethanol prices. 
The model is considered recursive in nature because ethanol blenders will make 
economic decisions based on last period’s information and across multiple time periods. 
This kind of model is useful because it allows variables like supply, demand, and prices 
to co-vary and interact over time.  For simplicity, imports are held constant at its 
historical average.  The oil price is also constant, and was acquired from the EIA’s 
Monthly Energy Review.  Imports and oil price for the simulation are .03 billion gallons 
and $81.34 per barrel, respectively.  Ethanol domestic, export, and end stock demand 
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residuals were simulated to estimate probability distributions for monthly ethanol prices 
and quantity demanded.  KOVs include monthly ethanol prices and total ethanol demand 
for 2014.   
This first step is to estimate the structural equations using ordinary least squares 
linear regression.  Four equations were estimated: supply, demand, demand for exports, 
and ending stocks.   
The supply equation for ethanol is specified as the following: 
 
 
 
St = b0 + b1 *St-1 + b2*Jan + b3*Feb + b4*Mar + b5*Apr + b6*May + b7*Jun + 
b8*Jul + b9*Aug + b10*Sept + b11*Oct + b12*Nov +b13*EPt-1 + b14*CPt-1 + 
b15*DV2006/2007t                                                                                                               (1)                                                         
 
 
 
where b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5 ,b6,b7, b8,b9, b10, b11, b12, b13, b14, b15 are the parameters to be 
estimated, subscript t is measured in months, S is the supply of ethanol in billions of 
gallons, St-1 is the supply of ethanol lagged one month (period), RFS is the Renewable 
Fuel Standard, Jan thru Nov are categorical dummy variables which represent a seasonal 
index, DV2006/2007 is dummy variable for 2006 and 2007, EPt-1 is the ethanol price 
lagged one period, CPt-1 is the corn price in dollars per bushel, and et is an error term.   
Lagged supply, St-1, is used to allow ethanol producers time to adjust to changing 
economic conditions, such as changing RFS mandate levels.  The full effects of change 
in price of ethanol are not felt immediately, but rather gradually over a period of time, 
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and are estimated using a structure proposed by Nerlove (1958).  Supply is a function of 
lagged corn and ethanol prices to make the model calculate supply in period t based on 
last period’s prices.  The categorical dummy variables for January thru November is 
estimating the seasonality in ethanol supply.  A dummy variable for 2006/2007 is 
estimating a structural shift in ethanol production as a result of EISA being passed. 
The domestic demand for ethanol is specified as:  
 
 
 
DDt = BWt + b1*OPt + b2*RFSt + b3*EPt + et                                                                (2) 
 
 
 
where b0, b1, b2, b3 are the parameters to be estimated, subscript t is measured in months, 
Dt is the demand for ethanol in billion gallons, BWt is a constant which represents the 
maximum amount of ethanol which can be blended into gasoline, OPt is the Brent crude 
oil price in dollars per barrel, RFSt is the Renewable Fuel Standard, EPt is the ethanol 
price per gallon, and et is an error term. 
Domestic demand is estimated by regressing ethanol demand on a constant term, 
BW, which is BW expressed in percentage terms.  The BWt variable will operate as an 
intercept shift when the BW is increased.  The sign is expected to be positive.  The sign 
on OPt will be positive if we assume oil and ethanol are substitutes for fuel.  RFS is 
expected to have to have a positive sign because each year, RFS will require more and 
more ethanol to be blended, thus shifting out demand. 
The export demand equation is specified as: 
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Exportst = b0 + b1 *Exportst-1 + b2*DV1t + b3*DV2t + b4*EPt + et                    (3) 
 
 
 
where b0, b1, b2, b3, b4 are the parameters to be estimated, subscript t is measured in 
months, Exportst is the demand for exports in billions of gallons, Exportst-1 is lagged 
export demand, DV1t and DV22 are dummy variables. EPt is the ethanol price, and et is 
an error term. 
Export demand is estimated using lagged export demand, and dummy variables.  
Lagged exports were included as an adjustment factor.  DV1 was added to capture a 
rising trend in exports during the first half of 2010.  DV2 was included because there 
was a record high spike in ethanol exports in 2011, which was partially due to Brazil’s 
need to import more ethanol as a result of a shortfall in their sugarcane harvest, their 
primary feedstock for ethanol production.  Ethanol exports increased from 10,000 barrels 
per day in early 2010 to 133,000 barrels per day at the end of 2011 (EIA, 2014b).   
The ending stocks equation is specified as: 
 
 
 
Ending Stockt = b0 + b1*DV1t + b2 *DV2013t + b3*Trendt + b4*EPt + et               (4) 
 
 
 
where b0, b1, b2, b3, b4 are the parameters to be estimated, subscript t is measured in 
months, Ending Stockt is the demand for exports in billions of gallons, DV1 is a dummy 
variable, DV2013 is a dummy variable for 2013, Trendt  is a time trend, EPt is the 
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ethanol price, and et is an error term.  DV1 is capturing periods of unusually high stocks 
at the end of the year for 2010-12.   
The system of equations will solve for equilibrium ethanol prices because we 
have four equations and four unknowns, which are linked together through ethanol price.  
The three demand equations can be added together and rewritten to calculate a total 
demand function.  The total demand equation can then be rearranged to solve for price.  
The recursive component is incorporated into the model by inputting the quantity 
supplied (which is based on last period’s information) in period t to solve for equilibrium 
price in month t.      
The next step is to implement the two constraints on the domestic demand curve 
for ethanol, which will kink the curve in two places, as shown in figure 4.1. There is a 
minimum demand for ethanol which forces the demand curve to be perfectly inelastic 
where the minimum required RFS level is set.  Demand for ethanol for any month must 
be greater than or equal to the RFS level for that year divided by 12.   The second kink 
exists because there is a maximum amount of ethanol which can be blended into 
gasoline as a fuel additive, which causes the demand curve beyond this point to become 
perfectly inelastic.  The EPA has approved only E10, a blend of gasoline with up to 10 
percent ethanol by volume, to be used in gasoline-powered engines.  Therefore, market 
demand for ethanol in any month cannot exceed 10 percent ethanol by volume of total 
gasoline consumption divided by 12 unless the EPA approves additional blends.  
Residual demand beyond the mandate will be exported or accumulated as ending stocks. 
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Scenario analysis will be used to evaluate alternative policy options.  The 
consequences of alternative policies can be compared by changing the level of the policy 
variable.  Because this model addresses RFS and the possibility of incorporating higher 
concentrations of ethanol-blended gasoline into the transportation fuel supply, scenarios 
will be developed which vary the RFS, corn price, and the maximum concentration of 
ethanol in gasoline.   
Scenarios will be simulated 500 times to approximate PDF graphs of annual 
ethanol prices assuming a level of RFS, ethanol concentration in gasoline, and corn 
price.  The KOVs will be average ethanol price and total ethanol demand for year 2014.  
The base scenario will include the 2014 statutory mandate of 12.65 billion gallons of 
ethanol, a 10 percent ethanol by volume requirement, and $4.15 per bushel corn price.  
The base scenario corn price was obtained from the University of Missouri’s Food and 
Agricultural Policy Research Institute U.S. Crop and Biofuel Baseline.  Alternative 
scenarios will vary the RFS and the BW concentrations.  Corn prices will vary from a 
mean value of $4.15 per bushel to low and high value of $3.74 and $4.57 respectively.  
The BW, or the maximum quantity of ethanol which can be blended into E10, E15, and 
E20 gasoline is calculated by multiplying the total forecasted demand for gasoline, 
134.60 billion gallons (EIA 2013a), by 10, 15 and 20 percent.  The maximum demand 
for 10, 15 and 20 percent ethanol is 13.46, 20.19, and 26.92 billion gallons.  Table 4.1 
summarizes 27 different scenarios to be analyzed: 
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Table 4.1. Scenarios to be Analyzed 
 
 
 
 
The scenarios will address the objective of this paper because we want to better 
understand how policy influences ethanol markets.  The purpose of the model is to 
estimate probabilistically how changes in policy variables and corn prices affect ethanol 
markets so policy-makers can make better decisions. 
It is important to check models for completeness and accuracy.  This is the final 
step in building the model. Verification is the process of confirming all equations in the 
model have been calculated appropriately and are calculating what they are supposed to.  
All equations are checked to ensure the variables and coefficients have been multiplied 
or added correctly.  Model validation ensures the residuals were simulated correctly and 
Scenario RFS Corn Price Blend Wall
1 13.12 3.74 13.46
2 13.12 4.15 13.46
3 13.12 4.57 13.46
4 13.12 3.74 20.19
5 13.12 4.15 20.19
6 13.12 4.57 20.19
7 13.12 3.74 26.92
8 13.12 4.15 26.92
9 13.12 4.57 26.92
10 11.73 3.74 13.46
11 11.73 4.15 13.46
12 11.73 4.57 13.46
13 11.73 3.74 20.19
14 11.73 4.15 20.19
15 11.73 4.57 20.19
16 11.73 3.74 26.92
17 11.73 4.15 26.92
18 11.73 4.57 26.92
19 14.43 3.74 13.46
20 14.43 4.15 13.46
21 14.43 4.57 13.46
22 14.43 3.74 20.19
23 14.43 4.15 20.19
24 14.43 4.57 20.19
25 14.43 3.74 26.92
26 14.43 4.15 26.92
27 14.43 4.57 26.92
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appropriately approximate a normal distribution.  The residuals were validated using 
statistical tests to ensure they were simulated properly.  
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5. RESULTS 
 
This chapter will focus on the results of the regressions described in Section 4, and it 
will be divided into three parts: 1.) regression results, 2.) a section dedicated to the 
presentation of elasticities, and 3.) summary statistics for the 27 scenarios.  
 
5.1 Regression Results 
Ordinary least squares is the preferred method for estimating the unknown 
parameters in a linear regression model.  The ideal model specification will be 
determined by comparing various measures of fit, including R2 and F-tests.  Parameter 
results are validated using a Student’s t-test.   Hypothesis tests will be used to check their 
validity. 
The coefficient of determination, or R2, indicates how well the data fit the 
regression model.  R2 is a number between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating a perfect linear 
relationship, and 0 indicating no fit. Selecting the appropriate independent variables can 
increase R2.  The R2 for production, domestic demand, export demand, and end stock 
demand are .992, .994, .867, .928, respectively, which implies the equation fits the data 
well. The results are presented in table 5.1. 
Another method used to determine model specification is the F-test.  The F-test is 
designed to test the significance of the R2 when multiple parameters are involved by 
comparing the ratio of two variances.  Equation (5) presents the formula for the F-test. 
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              (5) 
 
 
 
SSRr is the sum of squared residuals (SSR) for the restricted model, SSRu is the SSR for 
the unrestricted model, n is the number of observations, k is the number of independent 
variables in the unrestricted model, r is the number of restrictions, and n-k-1 represents 
the degrees of freedom. 
SSR measures the amount of variance in the data that is not explained by the 
regression model.   A small SSR suggests the model fits the data well.  It is ideal to have 
the unrestricted model closely resemble the restricted model because it implies the 
unrestricted model has explanatory power.  If they are different, it means the unrestricted 
form is not appropriately capturing the variation in the dependent variable.  If SSR is 
larger in the restricted model, F will also be large.  F is large when the restricted model 
makes the fit of the regression worse, which is when we should question the null 
hypothesis.  The restricted model will almost always have a larger SSR than the 
unrestricted model because the restricted model does not use all of the independent 
variables to minimize SSR.  The unrestricted model utilizes more independent variables 
which tend to reduce SSR.  The null hypothesis is formed under the assumption all 
independent variables are equal to zero.  The null will be rejected if the SSR of the 
restricted model is larger than the SSR of the unrestricted model because it is likely the 
unrestricted model has variables which should be included in the regression.  F-test 
results are presented in table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1. Model Specification Results 
 
 
 
 
F-test values are sufficiently large, which provide evidence in support of appropriate 
model specification. P-values for the F-ratio are also reported.  P-values help determine 
the significance of the F-test statistic.  A P-value is the smallest significance level at 
which the null hypothesis would be rejected.  This means small p-values are evidence 
against the null, while large P-values provide little evidence for rejecting the null 
hypothesis. 
Beta coefficients are interpreted as the expected change in the dependent variable 
for a one unit change in an independent variable, holding all other independent variables 
constant.  A Student’s t-test was used to determine if the coefficients are statistically 
different from zero.  T-test measures the size of the beta coefficient in relation to its 
standard error.  The null hypothesis assumes the beta coefficient is equal to zero.  Large 
values imply statistical significance and rejection of the null hypothesis.  Equation (6) 
shows the formula for the Student’s t-test. 
              (6) 
 
 
 
Supply Domestic Demand Export Demand Demand for End Stock
R-Sqaure 0.992 0.994 0.867 0.928
F-test statistic 686.580 3837.070 66.983 290.153
P-value on F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Table 5.2 shows the parameter results for the beta coefficients, t-tests, and P-values 
associated with each independent variable in the regression equations.  
 
 
 
Table 5.2. Parameter Results for Regression Equations
 
 
 
 
The second column in the table corresponds to the estimated coefficient for each 
independent variable.  The value of the coefficient measures the size of the marginal 
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effect the independent variable has on the dependent variable, and the sign gives the 
direction of change.  Signs are correct on all beta coefficients.   
The production equation results show corn price has a negative impact on ethanol 
production.  Seasonal variability is also a significant factor in determining ethanol 
production.  Ethanol price has a positive, but insignificant effect on supply.  Negative 
signs on the betas for Jan, Feb, Apr, Jun, and Sept indicate ethanol production in those 
months is less than average production across all of the observed data.  A positive sign 
for Mar indicates production in March is on average higher than average.   
The results for the domestic demand equation indicate the RFS is a significant 
aspect in determining demand for ethanol.  Its sign is positive which is expected.  A 
positive sign on the beta for BW shows a positive relationship between shifts in the BW 
and domestic demand.  The beta for the price of crude oil is slightly positive, which 
means crude oil prices have a relatively minor impact on demand for ethanol.   The sign 
on ethanol price is negative, but insignificant.  The negative sign on ethanol price in the 
export demand equation is expected, but it’s insignificant.  Finally, all betas in the end 
stock equation are significant. 
 
5.2 Estimates of Elasticities 
 Elasticities measure how responsive dependent variables are to changes in 
explanatory variables.  The formula to calculate the elasticity of demand (ed) with 
respect to price is shown below.  
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               (7) 
 
 
 
In words, the elasticity of demand is equal to the first derivative of demand with respect 
to price multiplied by the historical average price (P) and divided by the historical 
average demand (Qd).  The numerator is interpreted as a percentage change in quantity 
demanded, and the denominator is a percentage change in price.  An elastic demand 
implies small changes in price will result in large changes in demand, while inelastic 
demand elasticity indicates large changes in price will have to occur to create significant 
fluctuations in demand. 
 
 
 
Table 5.3. Elasticity Estimates 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.3 shows the elasticity estimates for the four structural equations.  Corn price 
was found to have little effect on production, based on its very inelastic elasticity.  
Supply will increase approximately .42 percent, if ethanol price rises by 10 percent.  
This is expected because in the historical data, ethanol production is steadily increasing 
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over time, while corn prices fluctuate rather significantly, from $3/bushel in 2006 to 
$7/bushel in 2012, and then begin to decline in 2013.  The elasticity of supply with 
respect to ethanol price is .04, which implies virtually no supply response to changes in 
ethanol price.  This can be explained because there is a minimum demand for 
oxygenates, and in the short-run, ethanol producers will not adjust their output due to 
capacity issues.  The elasticity of demand with respect to RFS is 0.712, which implies 
demand is relatively inelastic.  This means if RFS increases by 10 percent, demand for 
ethanol will expand by 7.12 percent.  It is also important to note the elasticity of demand 
with respect to the BW.  Its elasticity is 0.285, which means a 10 percent increase the in 
blend wall will increase demand for domestic ethanol by 2.85 percent.  Notice, domestic 
demand for ethanol is more sensitive to changes in the RFS and the BW.  The elasticities 
of domestic, export, and stock demand can be added together to estimate total elasticity 
of demand for ethanol.  The model approximates total demand elasticity to be -.859.   
 
5.3 Simulation Results 
Residuals for domestic, export, and end stock demand were simulated assuming a 
multivariate distribution, with a mean of zero and standard deviation equal to the 
standard deviation of the residuals associated with each demand equation.  The normal 
distribution was applied to the model to simulate monthly ethanol prices and total 
demand for ethanol in 2014.  27 scenarios were analyzed using stochastic residuals, 
which were simulated for 500 iterations.  
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In reference to table 4.1, scenario 2 will be considered the base scenario.  This 
scenario is considered the base because it is most likely to occur given current 
projections for RFS, corn price, and the BW.  The base scenario consists of 13.12 BN 
gallon RFS, $4.15 corn prices, and the BW equal to 10 percent.  Summary statistics for 
scenario 2 are presented in table 5.4. 
 
 
 
Table 5.4. Summary Statistics for the Base Scenario
 
 
 
 
Table 5.4 shows the mean and standard deviation of ethanol prices for each 
month, average ethanol price, and total ethanol demand for 2014.  Standard deviation is 
provided as an estimate of risk about the mean.  The table also reports minimum and 
maximum values for each KOV.  The average ethanol price in 2014 is estimated to be 
$1.89/gal.  Standard deviation for average ethanol price (.14) is relatively small, 
implying a tight probability distribution about the mean.  Average domestic demand for 
ethanol in 2014 is estimated to be 14.12 billion gallons.  
 An alternative method for analyzing risky KOVs is to visually inspect the 
simulation results with probability density functions (PDF).  PDFs are useful because 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Average Ethanol Price Total Ethanol Demand
Mean ($/gal) 2.51 2.83 2.37 2.23 1.73 1.57 1.41 1.31 1.62 1.67 1.76 1.69 1.89 14.118
StDev ($/gal) 0.77 0.81 0.86 0.86 0.83 0.85 0.83 0.85 0.90 0.86 0.87 0.91 0.14 0.020
CV 30.57 28.68 36.31 38.34 47.72 54.00 59.19 65.03 55.28 51.37 49.10 54.06 7.64 0.140
Min ($/gal) 0.57 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.46 14.048
Max ($/gal) 4.69 5.16 4.81 5.07 4.25 3.90 4.07 3.56 4.56 4.12 4.42 3.95 2.35 14.164
Notes: Prices are in real terms.  Ethanol demand is in billions of gallons.
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they graphically depict the estimate of risk by graphing the simulated KOVs over many 
iterations.  PDF graphs are presented in figures 5.1 and 5.2 for average annual ethanol 
price and total demand for ethanol in 2014. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. PDF Graph of Average Ethanol Price in 2014 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the PDF graph for annual ethanol price in 2014.  Price is on the 
x-axis.  The mean and 95 percent confidence intervals for the forecast are depicted as 
vertical lines.  Risk is shown as the horizontal distance from the mean.  The graph 
indicates average ethanol price is likely to be between $1.60 and $2.20 per gallon, at the 
95 percent confidence level. 
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Figure 5.2. PDF Graph of Total Demand for Ethanol in 2014 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 is the PDF representation of total domestic ethanol demand.  The 
graph shows a fairly wide dispersion of quantity demanded about its mean, suggesting 
demand is risky.  With 95 percent confidence, ethanol demand is estimated to be 
between roughly 14.08 and 14.16 billion gallons.  
The model was run for 27 different scenarios to simulate monthly ethanol prices.  
However, the KOVs reported below are average annual price and annual demand.  
Annual KOVs are reported to make comparisons across scenarios easier. The tables 
report KOV summary statistics for each scenario. 
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Table 5.5. Summary Statistics for 13.12 RFS
 
 
 
 
The best method of scenario evaluation is to compare the scenarios 9 at a time.  
Each group of 9 scenarios has a different RFS level.  For example, the first group of 9 
scenarios is calculated using an RFS of 13.12 billion gallons, the second group has an 
RFS level of 11.73 billion gallons, and the third group has an RFS of 14.43 billion 
gallons.  The three rows within each group are calculated with a BW of 10, 15, and 20 
percent, respectively.  Corn prices increase by 10 percent across each row.  In Table 5.5, 
row 1, RFS and the BW are held constant and corn price is allowed to increase.  
Comparing across the row, ethanol is not very sensitive to rising corn prices.  A 10 
percent increase in the price of corn only increases the price of ethanol roughly 
$0.03/gal.  Ethanol demand decreases approximately 30 million gallons in response to 
higher corn prices.  The price of ethanol is not sensitive to variable corn prices, as seen 
by constant standard deviation across the row.  In row 2 and 3, the assumptions are the 
Average Total Average Total Average Total
Ethanol Price Ethanol Demand Ethanol Price Ethanol Demand Ethanol Price Ethanol Demand
Blend Wall (E10) = 13.46 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Mean ($/gal) 1.86 14.121 Mean ($/gal) 1.89 14.118 Mean ($/gal) 1.92 14.116
StDev ($/gal) 0.14 0.020 StDev ($/gal) 0.14 0.020 StDev ($/gal) 0.14 0.020
CV 7.67 0.141 CV 7.54 0.143 CV 7.40 0.145
Min ($/gal) 1.41 14.049 Min ($/gal) 1.44 14.047 Min ($/gal) 1.47 14.046
Max ($/gal) 2.22 14.166 Max ($/gal) 2.25 14.165 Max ($/gal) 2.28 14.163
Blend Wall (E15) = 20.19
Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6
Mean ($/gal) 2.96 15.526 Mean ($/gal) 2.99 15.516 Mean ($/gal) 3.01 15.505
StDev ($/gal) 0.10 0.045 StDev ($/gal) 0.10 0.045 StDev ($/gal) 0.10 0.045
CV 3.25 0.291 CV 3.23 0.292 CV 3.21 0.292
Min ($/gal) 2.69 15.376 Min ($/gal) 2.71 15.365 Min ($/gal) 2.73 15.355
Max ($/gal) 3.28 15.656 Max ($/gal) 3.31 15.646 Max ($/gal) 3.33 15.635
Blend Wall (E20) = 26.92
Scenario 7 Scenario 8 Scenario 9
Mean ($/gal) 3.75 16.652 Mean ($/gal) 3.77 16.641 Mean ($/gal) 3.80 16.630
StDev ($/gal) 0.10 0.045 StDev ($/gal) 0.10 0.045 StDev ($/gal) 0.10 0.045
CV 2.57 0.272 CV 2.56 0.272 CV 2.54 0.272
Min ($/gal) 3.47 16.502 Min ($/gal) 3.50 16.491 Min ($/gal) 3.52 16.480
Max ($/gal) 4.07 16.782 Max ($/gal) 4.09 16.771 Max ($/gal) 4.12 16.760
Notes: Prices are in real terms.  Ethanol demand is in billions of gallons.
Corn Price = $3.74 Corn Price = $4.15 Corn Price = $4.57
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same as row 1, except the BW is increased to 15 and 20 percent.  Scenarios 2 and 5 can 
be compared to determine how much a BW increase to 15 percent will increase average 
ethanol price.  This can be done because the RFS and corn price assumptions are the 
same.  It is estimated the mean annual price of ethanol will increase from $1.89/gal to 
$2.99/gal.  Ethanol demand increased roughly 1.4 billion gallons, as expected.   The 
price increase is anticipated because an increase in the BW will allow more ethanol to be 
blended, thus pushing demand outward.  Each group of 9 scenarios can be compared in a 
similar fashion. 
 
 
 
Table 5.6. Summary Statistics for 11.73 RFS 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.6 shows the results of scenarios 10 through 18.  For these scenarios, RFS 
was reduced to its proposed RFS level of 11.73 billion gallons.   Scenarios 2 and 11 can 
be compared together to analyze the effect of a reduction in the RFS.  The comparison 
Average Total Average Total Average Total
Ethanol Price Ethanol Demand Ethanol Price Ethanol Demand Ethanol Price Ethanol Demand
Blend Wall (E10) = 13.46 
Scenario 10 Scenario 11 Scenario 12
Mean ($/gal) 1.58 13.555 Mean ($/gal) 1.60 13.545 Mean ($/gal) 1.63 13.534
StDev ($/gal) 0.11 0.049 StDev ($/gal) 0.11 0.049 StDev ($/gal) 0.11 0.049
CV 6.74 0.360 CV 6.64 0.361 CV 6.55 0.362
Min ($/gal) 1.28 13.429 Min ($/gal) 1.30 13.419 Min ($/gal) 1.32 13.408
Max ($/gal) 1.86 13.700 Max ($/gal) 1.88 13.690 Max ($/gal) 1.91 13.680
Blend Wall (E15) = 20.19
Scenario 13 Scenario 14 Scenario 15
Mean ($/gal) 2.37 14.684 Mean ($/gal) 2.40 14.673 Mean ($/gal) 2.42 14.662
StDev ($/gal) 0.11 0.050 StDev ($/gal) 0.11 0.050 StDev ($/gal) 0.11 0.050
CV 4.46 0.338 CV 4.42 0.339 CV 4.38 0.339
Min ($/gal) 2.07 14.555 Min ($/gal) 2.09 14.545 Min ($/gal) 2.11 14.534
Max ($/gal) 2.65 14.828 Max ($/gal) 2.67 14.817 Max ($/gal) 2.69 14.807
Blend Wall (E20) = 26.92
Scenario 16 Scenario 17 Scenario 18
Mean ($/gal) 3.16 15.810 Mean ($/gal) 3.18 15.799 Mean ($/gal) 3.21 15.788
StDev ($/gal) 0.11 0.050 StDev ($/gal) 0.11 0.050 StDev ($/gal) 0.11 0.050
CV 3.36 0.315 CV 3.33 0.315 CV 3.31 0.316
Min ($/gal) 2.86 15.681 Min ($/gal) 2.88 15.670 Min ($/gal) 2.90 15.659
Max ($/gal) 3.44 15.954 Max ($/gal) 3.46 15.943 Max ($/gal) 3.48 15.932
Notes: Prices are in real terms.  Ethanol demand is in billions of gallons.
Corn Price = $3.74 Corn Price = $4.15 Corn Price = $4.57
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can be done because scenarios 2 and 11 were calculated using the same exogenous corn 
price and BW constraint, but a different RFS.  If RFS is reduced, the mean ethanol price 
per gallon is estimated to decrease $0.29/gal.   Demand fell 600 million gallons in 
response to the reduction in the RFS.  Reducing RFS increases demand risk slightly, but 
reduces price risk by $0.03/gal.  Scenarios 11 and 14 can be compared to determine the 
effect of a reduction in RFS and an increase in the BW to 15 percent.  Under these 
conditions, an increase in the BW will expand demand for ethanol as expected by 1.1 
billion gallons, and increase the price of ethanol from $1.60/gal to $2.40/gal, or 
$0.80/gal. 
 
 
 
Table 5.7. Summary Statistics for 14.32 RFS 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.7 presents the results of the last 6 scenarios.  All scenarios in this table 
have increased the RFS mandate level to 14.32 billion gallons.  Scenarios 19 through 21 
are not reported because it is doubtful they will occur.  For instance, scenario 20 is 
questionable because the RFS mandate will exceed the BW.  This is highly unlikely 
Average Total Average Total Average Total
Ethanol Price Ethanol Demand Ethanol Price Ethanol Demand Ethanol Price Ethanol Demand
Blend Wall (E15) = 20.19
Scenario 22 Scenario 23 Scenario 24
Mean ($/gal) 3.41 16.381 Mean ($/gal) 3.43 16.373 Mean ($/gal) 3.45 16.364
StDev ($/gal) 0.10 0.048 StDev ($/gal) 0.10 0.048 StDev ($/gal) 0.10 0.048
CV 2.89 0.291 CV 2.88 0.292 CV 2.87 0.293
Min ($/gal) 3.11 16.257 Min ($/gal) 3.12 16.248 Min ($/gal) 3.14 16.239
Max ($/gal) 3.70 16.547 Max ($/gal) 3.72 16.539 Max ($/gal) 3.74 16.530
Blend Wall (E20) = 26.92
Scenario 25 Scenario 26 Scenario 27
Mean ($/gal) 4.31 17.448 Mean ($/gal) 4.33 17.438 Mean ($/gal) 4.35 17.427
StDev ($/gal) 0.10 0.045 StDev ($/gal) 0.10 0.045 StDev ($/gal) 0.09 0.044
CV 2.21 0.256 CV 2.20 0.255 CV 2.18 0.255
Min ($/gal) 4.00 17.322 Min ($/gal) 4.03 17.312 Min ($/gal) 4.05 17.301
Max ($/gal) 4.57 17.591 Max ($/gal) 4.60 17.580 Max ($/gal) 4.62 17.570
Notes: Prices are in real terms.  Ethanol demand is in billions of gallons.
Corn Price = $3.74 Corn Price = $4.15 Corn Price = $4.57
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because RFS each year will always be less than the BW.  However, we can compare the 
base scenario (scenario 2) to scenario 23.  When compared to the base scenario, a 10 
percent increase in RFS to 14.32 billion gallons and a BW increase to 15 percent, will 
cause ethanol price to rise from $1.89/gal to $3.43/gal.  Demand is estimated to increase 
nearly 2.2 billion gallons as a result of increasing the BW to E15 and the RFS to 14.32 
billion gallons.  Price risk decreases $.04/gal when compared to the base scenario.  If we 
compare scenario 23 and 26, it is possible demand will expand even further as the BW is 
increased to 20 percent. 
 
5.4 Model Validation 
 The model was validated to ensure risk has been properly incorporated into the 
model.   The residuals from the 3 demand equations were simulated using a normal 
distribution, with a mean equal to zero and a standard deviation equal to the standard 
deviation of the residuals from its respective OLS regression.  The actual and simulated 
residual values are presented in Table 5.8. 
 
 
 
Table 5.8.  Actual and Simulated Values for Residuals 
 
Domestic Demand Export Demand End Stock Demand
Mean 0 0 0
Standard Deviation 0.070 0.012 0.050
Domestic Demand Export Demand End Stock Demand
Mean -7.7E-06 -5.8E-06 -3.2E-05
Standard Deviation 0.050 0.012 0.070
Actual Residual Values
Simulated Residuals
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Statistical tests can be used to validate stochastic variables.  Because the 
residuals are univariate probability distributions, Student’s-t tests and F-tests are 
appropriate for testing the means and standard deviations, respectively.   The null 
hypothesis for the Student’s-t test assumes the actual mean and the simulated mean are 
equal.  If the simulated mean of the residual is not statistically equal to its actual mean, 
the test with reject the null hypothesis.  The F-test will determine if the variance was 
properly reproduced.  The null hypothesis will be rejected if the 2 standard deviations 
are not statistically equal to one another.  Table 5.9 shows the results of the validation 
tests. 
 
 
 
Table 5.9. Validation Test Results for the Simulated Residuals
 
 
 
 
Table 5.9 presents the results of the validation tests.  The test statistic and critical P-
values are provided for each test.  If the calculated test statistic is less than its critical 
value, then the test will fail to reject the null hypothesis that the mean and standard 
Distribution Comparison of Sim. DD Residuals & Actual DD Residuals
Confidence Level 95.00%
Test Value Critical Value P-Value
2 Sample t Test 0.00 2.27 0.997 Fail to Reject the Ho that the Means are Equal
F Test 1.01 1.28 0.457 Fail to Reject the Ho that the Variances are Equal
Distribution Comparison of Sim. Export Residuals & Actual Export Residuals
Confidence Level 95.00%
Test Value Critical Value P-Value
2 Sample t Test 0.00 2.31 0.998 Fail to Reject the Ho that the Means are Equal
F Test 1.02 1.40 0.432 Fail to Reject the Ho that the Variances are Equal
Distribution Comparison of Sim. End Stock Residuals & Actual End Stock Residuals
Confidence Level 95.00%
Test Value Critical Value P-Value
2 Sample t Test -0.14 2.27 0.886 Fail to Reject the Ho that the Means are Equal
F Test 1.01 1.32 0.500 Fail to Reject the Ho that the Variances are Equal
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deviation are statistically different.  Table 5.9 shows the historical mean and standard 
deviation of residuals for each equation have been statistically reproduced at an alpha 
level equal to .05. 
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Federal energy policy continues to play a role in the development of the biofuels 
industry.  Volatile world oil prices and political uncertainty has compelled political 
figures to search for practical alternatives to reduce U.S. dependence on imported oil.  
Ethanol has been identified as a viable option.  There have been various policy measures 
put in place to support biofuel production, some of which have expired.  One of the more 
profound forms of federal policy support is the RFS.  The RFS requires annual minimum 
usage volumes of biofuel for blending and has greatly expanded ethanol production and 
use, which has raised questions regarding its long-term sustainability and potential 
unintended consequences in corn and livestock markets. The issue with the RFS program 
is the required mandate for 2014 will likely cause gasoline consumption to hit the 
ethanol BW.  If the average ethanol blend exceeds 10 percent, the cost of fuel could 
increase, resulting in economic harm to consumers and possibly fuel shortages.  To 
avoid the ethanol BW, the EPA may need to reduce RFS or increase the BW by allowing 
the sale of higher ethanol blends, such as E15 or E20.  
The objective of this paper is to analyze the economic impacts of energy policy on 
the ethanol market.  Monte Carlo simulation was used to estimate stochastic monthly 
ethanol prices and total demand.  Scenario analysis was used to estimate how RFS 
affects ethanol demand, as well as the possibility of allowing the sale of higher ethanol 
blends.  The results can be used to assist decision-makers in making better decisions 
regarding energy policy. 
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A recursive, structural partial equilibrium model was developed to simulate monthly 
ethanol prices and total demand. Econometric equations were estimated for supply, 
domestic, export and ending stock demand.  The model was designed to provide a 
probabilistic projection of monthly ethanol prices and total demand for ethanol in 2014.  
It addressed both the RFS and the BW, both of which heavily influence the demand for 
ethanol.  The model is able to forecast ethanol prices and demand for a 12-month 
horizon.  The differences in the scenario KOVs were used to compare the consequences 
of alternative policy options.  The residuals from the 3 demand equations were simulated 
to estimate probability distributions for monthly ethanol prices and total demand.  The 
model was validated using statistical tests to ensure the residuals were properly 
simulated. 
The results of 27 scenarios show how sensitive ethanol markets are to exogenous 
changes in RFS, the BW, and corn prices.  Elasticities were estimated to measure how 
sensitive the structural equations are to changes in the independent variables.  The 
elasticity of supply with respect to corn price was found to be very inelastic (-.007).  The 
own-price elasticity of supply is .042, which implies a 10 percent increase in the price of 
ethanol will expand production by .042 percent.  The elasticity of demand with respect 
to RFS and the BW are 0.712 and 0.285, respectively.  The total own-price elasticity of 
demand for ethanol is -0.859.  A base scenario was chosen to compare various policy 
alternatives.  The base scenario consisted of a 13.12 billion gallon RFS, 10 percent BW, 
and $4.15 corn price.  The simulation estimated the average 2014 price of ethanol to be 
between $1.60 and $2.20 per gallon.  The expected price is $1.89/gal.  Total demand is 
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expected to be 14.12 billion gallons, but it will vary between 14.08 and 14.16 billion 
gallons.  Ethanol prices were found to be insensitive to corn prices.  Increasing corn 
prices 10 percent per bushel increased the average price of ethanol roughly $0.03/gal.  
Total demand was reduced 30 million gallons in response to increasing corn prices by 
$0.42 per bushel. The RFS was determined to play a substantial role in determining the 
demand for ethanol. When RFS is reduced from 13.12 to 11.73 billion gallons, ethanol 
prices fell $0.29/gal when compared to the base scenario.  Demand declined 
approximately 600 million gallons. The BW was found to significantly increase ethanol 
prices and total demand.  If the BW is increased to 15 percent, prices were estimated to 
increase $1.10/gal from the base scenario to $2.99/gal.  Ethanol demand increased about 
1.4 billion gallons.  Overall, the results show RFS and the BW positively affect ethanol 
pricing and demand. 
The current debate surrounding incentives to promote biofuel production is driven 
largely by the desire of Congress to reduce reliance on imported oil.  The EPA has 
considered reducing the biofuel mandates for 2014 because oil and gas companies are 
concerned it would be difficult to consume the targeted mandate for ethanol, given 
current EPA regulations and infrastructure issues.  High compliance costs, or high prices 
of the ethanol credits known as RINs, reflect difficulty in meeting the mandate.  The cost 
of compliance falls on gasoline refineries who must comply with the RFS mandate.  This 
link implies any increases in the cost of RINs will reduce the volume of gasoline 
supplied by refineries.  Those costs are ultimately passed on to the consumer as higher 
gasoline prices.  Unless gasoline consumptions begins to rise again, the results of the 
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study should indicate to Congress the ethanol mandate is a broken policy and is in need 
of a revamp.   
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